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Review Essay 
Dwayne Tunstall, Doing Philosophy Personally: Thinking 
about Metaphysics, Theism, and Antiblack Racism (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2013) 
Douglas Ficek 
John Jay College 
In his second book, Doing Philosophy Personally: Thinking about Metaphysics, 
Theism, and Antiblack Racism, Dwayne A. Tunstall argues, with and through 
Lewis R. Gordon, that teleological suspensions of philosophy are imperative, 
which is to say that philosophers need to recognize the extra-philosophical 
commitments that ground their work and accept the limitations of their own 
disciplinary preference.1 “For some philosophers,” he writes, “there are only 
arguments, but the purpose of such arguments beyond their validity is 
open....[One] is left at a loss to explain why philosophy without ultimate 
purpose does not collapse into a pseudoscience....[It] would seem that, in 
order to do philosophical work honestly, one has to suspend the centering of 
philosophy.”2 And what, as a philosopher, is his “ultimate purpose”? What 
is the extra-philosophical commitment that moves him to decenter 
philosophy? There are, it seems, two, and the first is theism. Tunstall, 
throughout Doing Philosophy Personally, demonstrates a commitment to 
theism and, more specifically, to the belief that “the divine...is the wellspring 
of ethical and religious values.”3 The second (and more important) 
commitment is his opposition to technological depersonalization and racist 
dehumanization – to anything, in other words, that transforms dynamic and 
dignified human beings (or persons) into mere things. “As a phenomeno-
logical metaphysician,” he explains: 
I am compelled to account for this experiential distinction by answering 
the following question: How can we adequately conserve the 
phenomenological distinction between viewing ourselves and our 
environing world as a collection of physical objects and events and 
viewing ourselves as meaning-bestowing and meaning-appreciating 
subjects (particularly as ethical and religious persons) in a way that 
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affirms the personal nature of human existence, but without negating 
our occasional experiences of ourselves as objects?4 
This question is important – if not fundamental – and it leads Tunstall to the 
existential philosophies of Gabriel Marcel and Lewis R. Gordon, among 
others, whose work he tries to synthesize into a humanistic, anti-racist 
theism for the twenty-first century. 
By far, it is Marcel who receives the most attention in Doing Philosophy 
Personally, and in chapter one, “Marcel's Reflective Method,” Tunstall 
explicates the religious existentialism of the French philosopher and 
playwright, focusing on his “transcendentalist roots”5 and the distinction 
between primary and secondary reflection. (Not surprisingly, one of the key 
concepts in this analysis is personhood.) Kant makes a distinction between 
phenomena and noumena, Tunstall argues, and that distinction, 
phenomenologically interpreted, reveals the ambiguous nature of human 
existence – namely, that we are both objects and subjects, that we both 
“cognize objects in the physical world and... experience the world as one 
where we have a moral obligation to other persons.”6 For Tunstall, this 
ambiguity is basic, and it is Marcel who articulates it best – though hardly 
perfectly – in his phenomenological and anti-rationalistic “reflective 
method,”7 in which there is a distinction between primary and secondary 
reflection. “Whenever we view the world,” Tunstall writes, explaining 
Marcel's position, “as quantifiable and objectified, we are viewing it from 
the vantage point of primary reflection. Stated differently, primary reflection 
is the method by which we are able to objectify ourselves and our 
environment for the purposes of scientific inquiry and manipulating our 
natural environment.”8 Secondary reflection, on the other hand, is when we 
view the world intersubjectively, as co-constituted by fellow persons “in the 
presence of the divine,”9 the “absolute Thou”10 with whom we can dialogue, 
however mysteriously, through prayer. For Marcel and Tunstall, it is 
secondary reflection that makes human (and religious) experiences 
intelligible – not primary reflection, which is dangerously reductionistic. 
In chapter two, “Transcending Philosophy by Teleologically 
Suspending Philosophy,” Tunstall continues his analysis of Marcel's 
“reflective method.”11 He explains how primary reflection can reduce 
human beings, in various ways, to their “merely empirical selves,”12 thus 
producing a world without persons, a world in which “we attempt to 
eliminate the mystery behind [the] momentous events in human 
existence.”13 Such a world, he argues, is populated by problems – by persons, 
in other words, from whom the non-empirical has been (tragically) 
excluded.14 We do not have to live in such a world, however. And why not? 
Because “we can transcend this level of human existence by reflecting upon 
our participation in being,”15 which is the very essence of secondary 
reflection. As Tunstall writes: “This mode of reflection is one in which we 
have to take ourselves in-to account. We cannot simply see the world as a 
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spectacle that we observe and analyze as impartial, detached analysts. We 
are always already participating in our environing world with other 
persons.”16 This point is profoundly phenomenological, to be sure, and it is 
not surprising that Tunstall appeals to Edmund Husserl to make further 
sense of it. Yet it should be pointed out that Marcel, unlike Husserl and even 
Paul Ricoeur, the latter of whom explicitly criticizes Marcel's “reflective 
method,”17 is not trying to develop a rigorous scientific and/or 
epistemological theory in his work. Indeed, he has serious reservations 
about that very endeavor – reservations that speak to his extra-philosophical 
commitment to personalization and humanization.18 “Marcel not only 
questions the scientific mode of philosophic inquiry,” Tunstall explains, 
but also rejects any and every attempt to construct a rigorous scientific 
epistemology. He replaces this quest for scientific rigor with neo-
Socratism. His neo-Socratism is a Socratic approach to philosophizing, 
but without the eristic dialectic wielded by Socrates in the early and 
middle dialogues. Marcel's neo-Socratic method allows him to 
examine the eidetic structures of certain personal experiences (for 
example, hope, fidelity, and love) and their significance in our lives.19 
Of course, many of these personal experiences constitute extra-philosophical 
values and commitments, which brings us back to Gordon's teleological 
suspension of philosophy, through which, according to Tunstall, we can 
better understand (and hopefully appreciate) Marcel's “reflective method.” 
After all, as he points out near the end of the chapter, “philosophic inquiry 
would have little to no significance apart from its extra-philosophical 
content.”20 
In chapter three, “Living in a Broken World,” Tunstall examines 
Marcel's critique of depersonalization and dehumanization, which alienate 
human beings from being and thus from other human beings – to say 
nothing of the divine, the aforementioned “wellspring of ethical and 
religious values.”21 (For many readers, this is where things will get 
especially interesting.) As Tunstall explains: “Marcel devised his...method as 
a means of conserving the ontological significance of human existence in a 
technocratic, ideological, and bureaucratic age....one in which many 
Westerners have, to their own detriment, forgotten the ontological exigency 
for being.”22 And what characterizes such an age? There are any number of 
examples–from the reduction of human beings to their quantifiable 
functions, to the regulation of virtually all aspects of human life; from the 
growing secularization of modern society, to the mind-numbing effects of 
technology. These things, according to Marcel, have broken our “sacred”23 
world, and now, as a result, “we lose the intimate sense of human 
experience and replace it with a sense of being a cog in a mas-sive, social 
machine.”24 (To better understand what Marcel is criticizing, think about the 
dystopian film Brazil, directed by Terry Gilliam, and how we seem to be 
moving in that decidedly absurd direction.) This is what Marcel saw in 
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World War I, in which he was a volunteer for the Red Cross, and especially 
in World War II, about which he writes some very interesting – and 
somewhat controversial – things, most of them concerning technology and 
its very real dangers.25 As Tunstall writes, explaining Marcel's position: 
What makes this attitude of [technological] mastery so dangerous is 
that it causes us to forget our exigency for being and replaces it with 
an insatiable desire for more advanced technological devices and 
services. As a consequence of this forgetting of being, we do not view 
technology as a means for us to better commune with other persons; 
rather, technology accelerates the dehumanization of persons  by 
making it easier to view ourselves as reducible to material bodies that 
are dependent upon technological devices and services to make their 
existence intelligible and meaningful.26 
There are countless examples of this accelerated dehumanization–some 
extraordinary, some mundane–and Tunstall appeals to Martin Heidegger 
and (neo-Heideggerian) Albert Borgmann to substantiate them, not only 
theoretically, but also empirically.27 He then concludes the chapter with a 
few words about Marcel's generally “neglected...sociopolitical thought,”28 
the normative thrust of which is that we must, as persons, oppose 
depersonalization and dehumanization in the global world, but in a way 
that avoids abstraction and (what many people refer to as) essentialism. 
In chapter four, “Lewis Gordon on Antiblack Racism,” Tunstall affirms 
Marcel's “reflective method” and his critique of technological 
depersonalization, but not uncritically. He points out that Marcel, his 
theoretical work on “technologies of degradation”29 notwithstanding, does 
not say much about antiblack racism, which is, hands down, one of the most 
extreme (and obvious) forms of depersonalization in the modern world. For 
Tunstall, this oversight is glaring and barely forgivable; moreover, it must be 
addressed if Marcel is going to be useful at all in the twenty-first century, 
which is still organized by “the color-line”30 in any number of ways. And 
who can provide an account of antiblack racism that is compatible with 
Marcel's critique of depersonalization? Gordon, not surprisingly, who 
argues that antiblack racism should be understood in terms of bad faith. As 
Tunstall writes: 
Bad faith is an effort by human persons to absolve themselves from 
their responsibility in coconstituting their own lives and their social 
institutions....In more Sartrean terms, individual bad faith occurs 
whenever we deny our role in coconstituting the meaningfulness of 
the phenomena we experience. Institutional bad faith, on the other 
hand, occurs whenever we neglect to recognize how we continually 
co-constitute with other persons the social institutions in which we 
live and simply regard [them] as ready-made entities.31 
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Of course, what follows from this description is that bad faith is really a 
denial of freedom and thus a denial of humanity itself, as freedom is, for 
existentialists like Gordon, the defining characteristic of the human being.32 
Antiblack racism is a form of bad faith here because it denies the freedom – 
the dynamic subjective life – of non-whites and reduces them to mere things, 
to problematic things. “The black Other,” Tunstall says, “is not a Levinasian 
Other (l'autrui) whom antiblack white racists recognize as a fellow person. 
For the white antiblack racist, the black Other is less than a person while the 
white antiblack racist occupies the peculiar position of regarding himself or 
herself as a self-sufficient and self-justifying being, precisely the 
characteristics traditionally possessed by the divine.”33 This is the very 
essence of racist dehumanization, and this is, according to Tunstall, what 
Marcel's “reflective method” needs in order to be relevant today. As he 
declares at the end of the chapter: “Proponents of Marcel's reflective 
method...need to examine how being racially black is seen by many to be a 
depersonalizing thing.”34 
In chapter five, “Criticizing Marcel's Reflective Method,” Tunstall 
investigates this unfortunate oversight in Marcel's “reflective method” 
further and concludes that Marcel “accepted...a colonialist logic with respect 
to Africana persons,”35 and that his “sociopolitical though advances a weak 
version of antiblack racialist reasoning.”36 And how does he arrive at this 
undeniably harsh conclusion? By submitting Marcel to an uncompromising 
Fanonian critique. Like many French liberals, Tunstall points out, Marcel 
was explicitly disgusted by American racism – epitomized by Jim Crow – 
but not by the racism and colonial, white supremacist practices of his own 
country.37 Indeed, Marcel takes the position that colonialism is often 
beneficial, and that the oppressive excesses of colonialism are bad, not 
because they depersonalize or dehumanize native peoples, but because 
torturous practices – in colonial Algeria, for example – are “unbecoming of 
French citizens.”38 For Tunstall, these positions are deeply offensive and 
obviously unacceptable, but they do not render Marcel's “reflective method” 
useless or somehow beyond theoretical redemption.39 “Marcel is right,” he 
explains, “to worry about Western modernity's tendency to devalue human 
personhood. However, he is blind to the fact that the conditions that he had 
worried would befall Western Europeans...had already been in existence for 
centuries...in the lives of enslaved and colonized Africana persons.”40 To 
“save” Marcel, he concludes, as a relevant philosopher with something to 
say about our deeply depersonalizing times, it is necessary to exercise these 
demons from his work–through Gordon, Fanon, and even Enrique Dussel.41 
Ultimately, Doing Philosophy Personally is an attempt to construct – or to 
begin constructing – a humanistic, anti-racist theism for the twenty-first 
century. By bringing together the existential philosophies of Marcel and 
Gordon, Tunstall hopes to contribute to the personalization and 
humanization of the world–an excellent, unabashedly ambitious goal. Is his 
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text successful? For the most part, yes. Doing Philosophy Personally is clearly 
written, well argued, and remarkably thoughtful; it is also a text with an 
impor-tant extra-philosophical purpose, which is not always the case. 
Having said that, there are some problems with Marcel's “reflective 
method” that are not addressed in the text, at least one of which, it seems, 
could easily derail Tunstall's liberatory project. The first is Marcel's 
(apparent) social conservatism, which comes out in his analysis of the 
Holocaust and in his analysis of contraceptive technology. To argue, as 
Marcel does, that the Holocaust was caused by secularization is a dangerous 
position, and the fact that racist dehumanization against non-whites existed 
for centuries before the so-called “death of God” took place demonstrates that 
sadism is flexible and compatible both with religious and non-religious 
worlds. Moreover, to argue, as Marcel does, that contraception is 
“degrading”42 is to reduce men and women – especially women – to their 
respective reproductive functions, thus preventing them from full 
participation in being. Could not contraception promote greater 
personalization and humanization in the world? 
The second (and more serious) problem with Marcel's “reflective 
method” is his overblown fear of “sociopolitical abstractions,”43 which is to 
say that his principled rejection of group identities is unnecessary – if not 
historically dangerous. He understands, correctly, that such identities can 
lead to fanaticism and dehumanizing violence, and his conclusion is that we 
should not appeal to them at all in our sociopolitical lives, that we should 
basically abandon them all in one fell swoop. As Tunstall explains: “This 
affective attachment is dangerous precisely because persons are willing to 
act on ill-conceived abstractions...regardless of the consequences for actual 
persons. All that matters to persons possessed by the spirit of abstraction is 
the realization of their abstractions at any cost.”44 Such an attitude, to be 
sure, is dangerous and undesirable, and Marcel is right to criticize it. But 
does he have to reject group identities full stop, many of which, even in 
recent years, have been sites of personalization, humanization, and 
sociopolitical liberation? Can Marcel (or Tunstall, for that matter) achieve 
the normative goal of a more human world – a world of intersubjective 
fraternity – without solidarity? I think not, and my worry, to conclude, is that 
this liberatory philosophy, for all of its normative content, does not allow for 
a meaningful, transformative praxis of the world. 
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